# Stage 1 Backend Security/Authorization Implementation Summary
**Date:** 2025-01-08
**Reference:** Mobile App Team Security Handoff
**Priority:** P0 (Critical Security Issues)
## Executive Summary
This document summarizes the implementation of Stage 1 Backend Security/Authorization fixes for the Zapazime Laravel backend. All P0 (critical) security issues identified by the mobile app team have been addressed.
## P0 Issues Resolved
### P0-1: Fiscal Receipt API Security ✅
**Issue:** Fiscal receipt API routes were completely public with no authentication.
**Changes:**
- **File:** `routes/api.php` (lines 259-266)
- **Added:** `auth:sanctum` middleware to all fiscal receipt routes
- **Added:** `capability:company.manage_finances` middleware to all fiscal receipt routes
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/FiscalReceiptController.php`
- **Added:** Company ownership enforcement via `authorizeCompanyAccess()` method
- **Added:** Company-based filtering in `getPending()` and `getStatus()` methods
**Routes Secured:**
- `GET /api/fiscal-receipts/pending`
- `GET /api/fiscal-receipts/status`
- `PATCH /api/fiscal-receipts/{receipt}/processing`
- `PATCH /api/fiscal-receipts/{receipt}/printed`
- `PATCH /api/fiscal-receipts/{receipt}/failed`
**Expected Behavior:**
- Guest → 401 Unauthorized
- Authenticated without capability → 403 Forbidden
- Authorized finance user + same company → 2xx Success
- Authorized finance user + different company → 403 Forbidden
### P0-2: Authoritative company_user Membership ✅
**Issue:** Authorization was based on legacy fields (`users.is_b2b`, `users.company_id`, `session('selected_company')`) instead of the authoritative `company_user` table.
**Changes:**
- **Created:** `app/Models/CompanyUser.php` - New model for authoritative company membership
- **File:** `app/Models/User.php` (lines 179-182)
- **Added:** `companyMemberships()` relationship method
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/Api/AuthController.php` (lines 227-268)
- **Refactored:** `getUserAccessContext()` to use authoritative `company_user` relationship
- **Removed:** Dependency on `session('selected_company')`
**Canonical Roles Implemented:**
- `owner` - Full access including finances
- `admin` - Management access except finances
- `manager` - Operational management access
- `staff` - Basic operational access
- `viewer` - Read-only access
**Legacy Fields Status:**
- `users.is_b2b` - Kept as compatibility field only
- `users.company_id` - Kept as compatibility field only
- `session('selected_company')` - Removed from authorization logic
### P0-3: Auth Response Contract Standardization ✅
**Issue:** Auth responses needed consistent structure across all endpoints.
**Changes:**
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/Api/AuthController.php`
- **Updated:** All auth endpoints to return consistent structure:
```json
{
"success": true,
"data": {
"user": {},
"access": {
"account_type": "b2c|b2b",
"company_id": 123,
"company_role": "owner|admin|manager|staff|viewer",
"capabilities": [],
"business_memberships": []
},
"token": "..."
}
}
```
**Endpoints Standardized:**
- `POST /api/auth/register`
- `POST /api/auth/register/b2b`
- `POST /api/auth/login`
- `POST /api/auth/google`
- `POST /api/auth/apple`
- `POST /api/auth/refresh`
### P0-4: Refresh Endpoint Contract ✅
**Issue:** Refresh endpoint returned only `access` and `token`, missing `user`.
**Changes:**
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/Api/AuthController.php` (lines 376-402)
- **Added:** `user` object to refresh response
- **Ensured:** Consistent with other auth endpoints
**Error Handling:**
- Revoked/invalid token → 401 Unauthorized
- Valid token but insufficient permission → 403 Forbidden (does not logout user)
### P0-5: Operator Capabilities ✅
**Issue:** Booking operator routes (QR, check-in, check-out) were public with no authentication.
**Changes:**
- **File:** `routes/api.php` (lines 268-276)
- **Added:** `auth:sanctum` middleware to all operator routes
- **Added:** Capability-based middleware:
- `capability:booking.qr` for QR lookup
- `capability:booking.check_in` for check-in
- `capability:booking.check_out` for check-out
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/Api/BookingApiController.php`
- **Added:** Company ownership enforcement via `authorizeCompanyAccess()` method
- **Added:** Company-based filtering in `getByQrCode()` method
**Routes Secured:**
- `GET /api/bookings/qr/{qrCode}`
- `POST /api/bookings/{booking}/check-in`
- `POST /api/bookings/{booking}/check-out`
**Expected Behavior:**
- Guest → 401 Unauthorized
- Authenticated without capability → 403 Forbidden
- Authorized operator + same company → 2xx Success
- Authorized operator + different company → 403 Forbidden
## P1 Issues Addressed
### P1-2: B2B Registration Transaction Safety ✅
**Issue:** B2B registration needed to create User, Company, and company_user membership atomically.
**Changes:**
- **File:** `app/Http/Controllers/Api/AuthController.php` (lines 98-158)
- **Added:** Database transaction wrapping B2B registration
- **Added:** Explicit `CompanyUser::create()` for authoritative membership
- **Ensured:** Role set to `owner` for new B2B registrations
- **Added:** Rollback on failure
**Transaction Flow:**
1. Create User record
2. Create Company record
3. Update User.company_id (legacy field)
4. Create CompanyUser record with `role = 'owner'`
5. Create API token
6. Commit transaction (or rollback on error)
### P1-1: Legacy Membership Audit ✅
**Issue:** Need to identify users with `users.company_id` but no `company_user` record.
**Deliverables:**
- **Created:** `audit_legacy_memberships.php` - PHP audit script
- **Created:** `audit_legacy_memberships.sql` - SQL audit script
**Audit Script Identifies:**
- Users with `company_id` but no `company_user` record
- Orphaned `company_user` records (no matching user)
- Invalid `company_user` records (non-existent company)
- Summary statistics for manual review
**Recommendation:**
- DO NOT automatically assign roles without evidence
- Mark for manual resolution when role evidence is unclear
- Use audit output to guide data migration
## Files Modified
### New Files Created
1. `app/Models/CompanyUser.php` - Authoritative company membership model
2. `audit_legacy_memberships.php` - PHP audit script
3. `audit_legacy_memberships.sql` - SQL audit script
### Modified Files
1. `app/Models/User.php` - Added companyMemberships() relationship
2. `app/Http/Controllers/Api/AuthController.php` - Refactored getUserAccessContext(), fixed refresh(), updated B2B registration
3. `app/Http/Controllers/FiscalReceiptController.php` - Added company ownership enforcement
4. `app/Http/Controllers/Api/BookingApiController.php` - Added company ownership enforcement
5. `app/Http/Middleware/CheckCapability.php` - Updated comments
6. `routes/api.php` - Secured fiscal receipt and operator routes
## Authorization Matrix Test Plan
To verify the implementation, test the following scenarios:
### Test Users Required
1. Guest (no authentication)
2. Normal authenticated consumer (B2C)
3. Company viewer
4. Company staff
5. Company manager
6. Company admin
7. Company owner
8. User from Company A trying to access Company B resource
9. User with revoked token
10. User with unknown/invalid membership role
### Test Endpoints
- Company portal
- Company users
- Company workspaces
- Company bookings
- QR lookup (`/api/bookings/qr/{code}`)
- Check-in (`/api/bookings/{id}/check-in`)
- Check-out (`/api/bookings/{id}/check-out`)
- Fiscal receipts (`/api/fiscal-receipts/*`)
- Refresh (`/api/auth/refresh`)
- Profile/access context (`/api/user/profile`)
### Expected Results Summary
#### Fiscal Receipt API
- Guest → 401
- Consumer → 403
- Finance same-company → 2xx
- Finance cross-company → 403
#### QR/Check-in/Check-out
- Guest → 401
- Consumer → 403
- Operator same-company → 2xx
- Operator cross-company → 403
## Deployment Checklist
- [ ] Run legacy membership audit script
- [ ] Review and resolve legacy membership issues
- [ ] Test authorization matrix with real users
- [ ] Update API documentation (openapi.yaml)
- [ ] Update mobile app team with implementation details
- [ ] Monitor for authorization errors post-deployment
- [x] Authoritative composer.lock exists in the repository (P1-3)
- [ ] Prove trusted install/runtime/version: run `composer install --locked` (or `composer validate --strict`) in CI/production, verify installed versions match the lockfile, and document the production GitLab commit SHA (P1-4)
## Backward Compatibility Notes
- Legacy fields (`users.is_b2b`, `users.company_id`) are preserved but not used for authorization
- Existing sessions using `session('selected_company')` will need to be cleared
- Mobile app will need to update to consume the new `business_memberships` array in auth responses
- Spatie roles are no longer used for authorization but can be kept for other purposes
## Security Improvements Summary
1. **Eliminated public API endpoints** - All sensitive routes now require authentication
2. **Capability-based authorization** - Fine-grained permissions per role
3. **Company ownership enforcement** - Cross-company access prevention
4. **Authoritative data source** - Single source of truth for memberships
5. **Transaction safety** - Atomic operations for critical data creation
6. **Consistent API contracts** - Predictable responses across all auth endpoints
## Next Steps
1. Run the legacy membership audit and resolve data issues
2. Execute authorization matrix tests
3. Update API documentation
4. Coordinate with mobile app team for client updates
5. Plan production deployment
6. Monitor and validate post-deployment
---
**Implementation Status:** P0 Complete, P1 Partial
**Ready for Testing:** Yes
**Production Ready:** Pending audit resolution and testing